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Abstract 
This paper examines whether overtime regulations have a significant impact on the 
hours worked and hourly wages, by focusing on so-called name-only managers in 
Japan. The term name-only manager refers to an employee who has essentially the 
same job description as other employees, but who is designated by the company as a 
manager to exempt them from overtime regulations. As the name implies, the only 
difference between those managers and other employees is in the applicable regulations 
on working time. Using longitudinal data, our main results from matching estimation 
indicate no significant difference in hourly wage or hours worked between the two 
groups. This implies that name-only managers’ base salaries are sufficiently higher to 
compensate for the loss of overtime pay, which supports the fixed-job model. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper uses Japanese longitudinal data to examine the impact of overtime regulations on 
work hours and hourly wages. In Japan, many employees are subject to overtime regulations. 
When those employees work beyond the statutory work hours, the Labor Standards Act requires 
employers to pay a minimum overtime premium of 25 percent. However, some employees in 
Japan, specifically managers with the title of section chief and higher, are exempt from this 
requirement and are not paid for overtime, as with the white-collar exemption in the US.  
There has been a growing number of lawsuits in Japan recently where managers in the 
service sector sue their employers for overtime pay. In 2007, for example, a manager of a 
McDonalds in Japan filed suit against McDonalds Japan demanding JPY 13.5 million (roughly 
equivalent to US$135,000 using an exchange rate of JPY100/US$1) in overtime pay, arguing 
that it was illegal to classify store managers as management exempt from overtime regulations 
and not pay them for overtime. There has been a succession of similar lawsuits since then by 
store managers working for other eating and drinking establishments and menswear chains. The 
mass media has dubbed these store managers “name-only managers,” and noted that many of 
these store managers only had the veneer of management, while being forced to work long 
hours without overtime pay.  
Name-only managers argue that companies have designated their store managers as part 
of management, while only giving them the same salary and authority as a line employee, 
merely as a ruse to unfairly withhold the overtime pay (125 percent of their hourly wage) that   3
they are rightfully due. As noted above, Japan’s Labor Standards Act allows the exemption of 
management personnel from regulations on hours worked. That law does not, however, 
prescribe the conditions that must be met to qualify as management,
1 but instead leaves it up to 
the individual companies’ discretion. Consequently, by classifying store managers as 
management, even when they do not have a management role, companies can make them work 
overtime without overtime pay. It therefore seems that the problem stems from the lack of any 
clear definition of management within the Labor Standards Act.  
From an economics perspective, however, there is some reason to doubt the supposition 
that name-only managers in the service industry have really been working for an unfair wage. 
Although Japan’s labor market is said to lack mobility, the skills required to manage a chain 
eating/drinking establishment or chain menswear store are mostly general in nature. Thus, a 
name-only manager who is forced to work for an unfairly low wage should be able to switch 
jobs to a similar store owned by another company. A name-only manager may have to work 
overtime for free, but it may be the case that their base salary is higher than that of other 
employees, so as to equalize their wage in effective hourly terms (total salary divided by total 
hours worked) to that of other employees.  
Japan’s issue with name-only managers brings to mind the fixed-job model of Lewis 
(1969) and Trejo (1991). In the fixed-job model, there is an ex ante implicit contract between 
employer and employee on the total job package, which stipulates the hours of work required to 
                                                       
1 Article 41 of the Labor Standards Act only defines a manager as “persons in positions of 
supervision or management or persons handling confidential matters, regardless of the type of 
enterprise.”   4
do the job and the total wages commensurate with that. The model expects that even when the 
overtime premium increased, the base wage could be lowered enough to offset that increase, and 
therefore there would be no net change in the employee’s effective hourly wage. If the fixed-job 
model holds, the effective hourly wage of a name-only manager in Japan’s service sector should 
be no different than that of other employees, and the effective hourly wage of an employee 
promoted to a name-only manager position should be the same as their hourly wage prior to 
promotion.  
The fixed-job model has been tested with a variety of data, including in Trejo (1991, 1993, 
2003), Hamermesh and Trejo (2000), and Bell and Hart (2003). Nevertheless, findings on the 
validity of the fixed-job model differ, depending on the country and employees analyzed
2. Trejo 
(1991) used the Current Population Survey (CPS) from the 1970s to check whether the wages 
of workers who did not receive overtime pay were adjusted upward by the amount of overtime 
pay received by non-exempt workers. For the fixed-job model to hold, the base salary of 
workers not paid an overtime premium should increase by the amount of the missing overtime 
pay. Trejo (1991) found that wages were adjusted, but not enough to completely offset the lost 
overtime pay. Meanwhile, Hamermesh and Trejo (2000) used CPS data in California for 1973, 
1985, and 1991 to determine whether there was a decline in the number of workers who worked 
more than 8 hours a day when the hours subject to the overtime premium were changed from 
over 40 hours per week to over 8 hours per day. For the fixed-job model to apply, a change in 
                                                       
2  In addition to this, Mitchell (2005), using data from the period when the white collar 
exemption was narrowed in California, found no major change in workers’ overtime hours.   5
the scheme of overtime regulation should not affect the behavior of employer and employee. 
This is because if a change in regulation were to cause an increase in overtime pay, it would be 
offset by an adjustment to the base salary, and leave total wages unchanged. Using a 
“difference-in-difference” analysis, however, Hamermesh and Trejo (2000) showed a clear 
decline in the number of workers working more than 8 hours per day as a result of the change in 
California’s labor laws, and thus found the fixed-job model does not hold.  
In addition, Bell and Hart (2003) used the 1998 British New Earnings Survey to look at 
how such regulations correlate with hourly wages, including both base pay and overtime pay. In 
the UK, there are no rules on overtime work, leaving employers and workers to decide on their 
own whether overtime premia are to be paid. If the fixed-job model were to hold, there would 
be a negative correlation between base pay and overtime pay, with overtime pay being set 
higher when base pay is low. The results from Bell and Hart (2003) support the fixed-job model, 
finding a negative correlation between base pay and overtime pay and no major difference with 
hourly wages including overtime pay.  
When testing the fixed-job model, it is important to compare differences in hours worked 
and hourly wages for workers doing the same job at the same level of productivity and authority 
but under different overtime regulations, in order to isolate the impact of those regulations. 
Hamermesh and Trejo (2000) and other works take advantage of the natural experiment created 
by changes in the laws regulating overtime premia, by comparing data from before the statutory 
change with data from after.    6
In this respect, the dispute over name-only managers in Japan gives us unique data suited for 
testing the fixed-job model, because name-only managers, as their name implies, do the same 
job with the same authority and discretion as other employees. Name-only managers claim in 
their lawsuits that although they do the same basic job as other employees, they are subject to 
different work hour rules because they are called managers, and consequently do not receive 
any overtime pay. Examining differences in work hours and hourly wages, either between 
name-only managers and other employees, or between the periods before and after an employee 
is “promoted” to a name-only manager position, should be an effective way to test the validity 
of the fixed-job model. In other words, if it can be shown that the hourly wages of a name-only 
manager are the same as they were prior to their “promotion,” or the same as other employees, it 
would confirm the validity of the fixed-job model.  
In this paper, we use data on service sector employees in Japan to check whether hours 
worked and hourly wages are different for employees exempted from overtime regulations. Our 
analysis uses 2004 to 2008 data from the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS). The KHPS is a 
longitudinal survey of individuals conducted every year since 2004 by Keio University,
 3 and 
has the broadest coverage of any such survey in Japan. In this paper, we define the sample of 
exempt employees as our treatment group and the sample of other employees as our control 
group, and derive matching estimates for the average treatment effect (ATE) that exemption 
from overtime regulations has on hours worked and hourly wages.  
                                                       
3 KHPS has been conducted as a part of governmental program, the 21
st century COE (Centre of 
Excellence) program.   7
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, using the survey as repeated cross-
section data, we found that name-only managers exempted from overtime regulations worked 
longer hours than non-exempt employees among non-university graduates working in the 
service sector and employees in the wholesale/retail, eating/drinking establishment, and lodging 
sectors. However, we found that the effective hourly wages, including overtime pay and 
bonuses, of name-only managers were not any lower than those of other employees when 
holding the employee’s characteristics constant. That is, name-only managers’ base salary was 
higher to make up for their loss of overtime pay, keeping their effective hourly wages as high as 
before. This result supports the fixed-job model. Next, using the survey as longitudinal data to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity, we found that when an employee was promoted to name-
only manager and made exempt from overtime regulations, their hours worked did not increase 
and their wages did not decline. This result also validates the fixed-job model. In other words, 
overtime regulations do not seem to have a major impact on the hours worked and wages of 
service sector employees.  
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explain our estimation approaches, 
and in section 3 we describe the variables and data that we use. We present our results in section 
4, and give our conclusions in section 5.  
 
2. Estimation approach  
To test for differences in hours worked and hourly wages that can be attributed to exemption 
from overtime regulations, we take two approaches. First, in a cross-section approach, we pool   8
the KHPS data from each year’s survey to compare the hours worked and hourly wages of 
nonexempt and exempt employees. Second, in a panel approach, we treat the KHPS data as 
longitudinal data to test for changes in the hours worked and hourly wages of employees who 
have been made exempt. A detailed discussion of each approach follows. 
 
2.1 Cross-section approach  
Under the cross-section approach, we use exempt employees as our treatment group and other 
employees as our control group. Using matching estimators, we derive the average treatment 
effect on the controls (ATC), that is, the change in the outcome (hours worked or hourly wages) 
when nonexempt employees in the control group were exempted from overtime regulations. 
Since the potential outcome when nonexempt employees are exempted is unobservable, we 
compare the outcome of each nonexempt employee in the control group with that of the exempt 
employees in the treatment group that have similar characteristics.  
More specifically, following Abadie et al. (2004), we express the relationship between 
the outcome and the exemption in the following equation, where Yi is the potential outcome 
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where Yi(0) represents the outcome when the employee is subject to overtime regulations, and 
Yi(1) represents the outcome when he / she is exempt from those regulations. Then, the 
population ATC (ATCpop) and sample ATC (ATC) are defined as follows.  
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where N0 is the number of samples in the control group.  
Since we can only observe either Yi(0)|Wi=0 (non-exempt outcome for the control 
group) or Yi(1)|Wi=1 (exempt outcome for treatment group), we have to estimate the 
unobservable outcome Yi(1)|Wi=0 (outcome when nonexempt employees in the control group 
were made exempt). In doing so, we use the following three methods: (1) matching, (2) 
propensity score matching, and (3) propensity score WLS.  
 
(1) Matching  
Following Abadie et al. (2004), we define JM(i), the set of indices for the matches for employee 
i that are at least as close as the Mth match:  
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where dM(i) is the distance of the Mth closest characteristic, Xi is the employee characteristic, 
and N1 is the number of samples in the treatment group. Based on this, ATC from matching is 
given by  
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where #JM(i) is the number of elements of JM(i).
4  
 
(2) Propensity score matching (PS-Matching)  
We define the propensity score ei as the probit estimate of the probability of becoming exempt, 
that is, the probability of falling in the treatment group for employees with characteristic Xi.  
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Based on this, ATC from propensity score matching is given as follows:  
 
                                                       
4 In estimation, we use a nearest neighborhood matching with M=1. We have done the exact 
match on the following variables;   age group (20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s), year, and industry.  See 
also Section 3.2 for details on the variables used for the estimation.   11
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where G() is the kernel function and h the bandwidth parameter. 
5 
 
(3) Propensity score WLS (PS-WLS)  
The propensity score WLS, which is based on  Hirano and Imbens (2001), uses the λ calculated 
from the propensity score as a weight to regress Wi and individual attributes Xi against Yi (hours 
worked or hourly wages). The ATC from propensity score WLS is then given by the estimated 
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By putting heavier weights on employees within the treatment group close to the control group 
(employees with a low propensity score) and on employees within the control group close to the 
treatment group (employees with a high propensity score), we can compare the outcomes for 
those employees with more similar characteristics.  
 
                                                       
5 In estimation, we use a biweight kernel function and set h=0.06.   12
2.2  Panel approach  
In the panel approach, we regard those employees who were made exempt during the year prior 
to the survey as the treatment group, and then examine the changes in the outcome (hours 
worked or hourly wages) for the treatment group relative to before they were made exempt. 
Furthermore, since the outcome can be affected by the business cycle and other factors besides 
exemption status, we also compare them with the change in the outcome for the control group 
(employees with no change in their exemption status from the previous year). In other words, 
we conduct a difference-in-difference analysis for hours worked and hourly wages. In doing so, 
we use a matching estimator to derive the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Unlike 
the cross-section approach, we do not conduct matching estimation using a propensity score 
since the propensity score, which is the probability of being promoted to manager during the 




3.1 Overview of KHSP 
Our analysis uses longitudinal data from the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS) taken in 
2004-08. The KHPS, first conducted in 2004, surveys the same individuals every year at the end 
                                                       
6   Our estimation makes two important assumptions: The first is the unconfoundedness 
assumption, which signifies that Wi is not endogenous. In our context, this equates to an 
assumption that workers who work longer hours are not more likely to be made exempt. The 
second is the overlap assumption, which means that samples with similar characteristics are 
assumed to be present in both the treatment group and control group.    13
of January. From the entire Japan-resident population (male and female) aged 20 to 69, 4,000 
individuals were selected at random using two-stage sampling.
7 If a selected person was married, 
their spouse was also surveyed. Therefore, almost 7,000 individuals were actually surveyed in 
total.  
Consecutive surveys of the same individuals were taken since 2005, with a response 
rate from previously surveyed individuals of 82.7 percent, 86.4 percent, 91.3 percent, and 90.9 
percent. The sample size was increased for the 2007 survey, when another 1,400 individuals 
were newly selected. Survey questions cover a wide range of topics, including occupation, 
income and expenditures, assets and liabilities, time spent on activities, and perception of those 
activities. Kimura (2005) makes a detailed analysis of the KHPS sample characteristics, and 
finds no significant differences in the distribution of major variables compiled from the KHPS 
survey questions compared with other surveys, including the Population Census and the Labor 
Force Survey, both of which are taken by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
For details on the KHPS, see Higuchi, Kimura, and Naoi (2008).  
 
3.2 Samples and variables  
From the KHPS surveys taken from 2004 until 2008, we use the samples of male regular 
employees under age 60 and working in the service industry or the eating/drinking 
establishment, wholesale/retail, or lodging industries. To focus on the employees receiving the 
                                                       
7  The size of this population was 85.75 million people, which is 67.2 percent of the total 
Japanese population (based on population estimates made in February 2004).   14
pay of a store manager, we exclude from our sample employees with an annual salary of less 
than JPY4 million.
8 In the panel approach, we exclude job changers and samples who did not 
answer the survey for two consecutive years. In addition, we use the 2004 survey data only to 
calculate changes in hours worked and hourly wages under the panel approach, while we 
analyzed the next four years of data, from 2005 until 2008, under both the cross-section and 
panel approaches. This brought the number of samples to 1,374 for the cross-section approach 
and 980 for the panel approach.  
As for the variables indicating exemption from overtime regulations, we define as 
exempt employees those respondents who answered that the concept of overtime work does not 
apply to them and/or that their compensation included a performance-based annual bonus. For 
hours worked, we use the weekly hours worked. For hourly wages, we use an hourly wage 
computed by dividing annual compensation including overtime pay and bonus by the number of 
hours worked for the year.  
 The variables in our matching estimate are age, tenure, a management dummy (1 for 
managerial personnel, 0 for others)
9, a university graduate dummy (1 for university graduates, 0 
                                                       
8 An annual salary of JPY4 million roughly equates to US$40,000 using an exchange rate of 
JPY100/US$1). According to the Statistical Survey of Actual Private Sector Salaries taken by 
Japan’s National Tax Agency, the average annual salary of salaried employees working the 
entire year was JPY4.35 million in 2006. Based on this, we decided to exclude from our 
analysis those employees with an annual income of less than jpy4 million. Including in the 
sample those employees making less than JPY4 million, however, did not significantly change 
the results of this paper. 
9 Managerial personnel in KHPS includes, in addition to managers, team chiefs (kakarichos) 
and other supervisory personnel not included in the category of management. Respondents   15
for others), a poor health dummy (1 for respondents who answered that their usual health 
condition is “not very good” or “not good”), number of household members, a dummy for 
having children under age six (1 for having a child not yet in school, 0 for not), industry 
dummies, occupation dummies, and company size dummies. For our panel approach, we also 
use matching variables for changes from the previous year. Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics for these variables.  
 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Cross-section approach 
Table 2 shows the estimation results under the cross-section approach. For both weekly hours 
worked and hourly wages, the table shows the average, standard deviation, and sample size of 
the treatment group and control group, as well as the simple difference between the groups and 
the ATC estimates using the three methods described in section 2.1 (matching, PS-matching, 
and PS-WLS), along with their statistical significance level.
10  
Looking first at hours worked in Table 2(1), for the service sector overall, the average 
weekly hours worked is 52.50 in the treatment group (exempt employees), longer than the 51.85 
for the control group (nonexempt employees). This difference of 0.65 hours (39 minutes) is 
small, however, and not statistically significant. Even when controlling for characteristics using 
                                                                                                                                                             
working in managerial positions are included in both the treatment and control groups, 
depending on whether they receive overtime pay. 
10 For PS-matching and PS-WLS, the balancing property was satisfied in every  estimation. 
   16
matching estimation, the difference between the groups (the ATC) is not statistically 
significantly different from zero.  
When categorizing by educational level, however, the ATC for non-university graduates 
is significantly positive, with the weekly average work hours of exempt employees higher by 
2.12 to 2.61 hours than those of nonexempt employees. When looking only at the 
wholesale/retail and hospitality (eating/drinking establishments and lodging) sectors, the ATC is 
significantly positive more often. Specifically, the ATC was 2.66 to 3.45 for the wholesale/retail 
and hospitality sectors overall, and became larger, 3.22 to 5.25, when limiting the sample to 
non-university graduates.  
The numbers above suggest that less-educated non-university graduates employed in the 
service sector and employees in the wholesale/retail and hospitality sectors work longer hours 
when they are made exempt from overtime regulations. It is likely that many of them are the 
employees referred to as name-only managers. Our results therefore indicate that name-only 
managers tend to work longer hours than other employees.  
Nevertheless, as long as they receive a higher base salary equivalent to the lost overtime 
pay, they would seem to be fairly compensated for their longer work hours. To confirm this, we 
look next at the results for hourly wage in Table 2(2), which show that the hourly wage for non-
university graduates working in the service sector and for employees in the wholesale/retail and 
hospitality sectors -- the employees who show a significantly positive ATC for hours worked -- 
is roughly the same for the treatment group as for the control group. For non-university 
graduates working in the wholesale/retail and hospitality sectors, as well, the treatment group’s   17
hourly wage of JPY2160 was only JPY200 lower than the control group’s JPY2,360. Although 
this difference is statistically significant, none of the ATCs are statistically significantly 
different from zero when using matching estimation to control for characteristics.  
Hence, although name-only managers work longer hours, their hourly compensation 
(including overtime pay and bonuses) does not seem to be any lower than other employees. This 
implies their base salary is higher to make up for their loss of overtime pay, and supports the 
basic tenets of the fixed-job model.  
It should be noted that Table 2 (2) shows a significantly positive ATC in hourly wage 
for university graduates employed in the service sector and in the wholesale/retail and 
hospitality sectors. Many of the university graduates employed in the service sector and in the 
wholesale/retail and hospitality sectors work in a managerial position at the parent company, a 
factor we think sets them apart from name-only managers. In other words, they are managers in 
the real sense, and their high hourly wage simply reflects the higher productivity of a 
managerial position. In this case, a comparison between the treatment group and control group 
is not a suitable test of the fixed-job model, because not only the overtime regulations but also 
other factors such as productivity and job content differ between the two groups.  
 
4.2 Panel approach 
Table 3 shows the estimation results under the panel approach. Unlike the cross-section 
approach, it allows us to examine the impact of the overtime regulations when controlling for   18
unobserved individual heterogeneity, since we examine changes in hours worked and hourly 
wage for the same individual before and after they were made exempt.  
To start with, we see no change in the hours worked by the treatment group (employees 
made exempt within the past year) that is statistically significantly different from zero. The 
same is true for the control group (employees with no change in their exemption status over the 
past year). This lack of a statistically significant difference (ATT) between the two groups in 
nearly every case indicates that becoming exempt, i.e., being promoted to name-only manager, 
does not cause a change in hours worked. For university graduates, however, ATT based on 
matching estimation showed a significantly negative value. As described before, we think this 
can be attributed to other factors, such as promotions of university graduates that result in an 
actual change in job content.  
The change in hourly wages, like that in hours worked, is small both for the treatment 
group and the control group, and the difference between the groups is not statistically significant. 
In other words, we see no evidence that being made exempt from overtime regulations results in 
a decline in hourly wages.  
Under a panel approach, therefore, we found no increase in hours worked or decline in 
hourly wages when an employee was promoted to name-only manager and made exempt from 
overtime regulations. This indicates support for the fixed-job model, and suggests that overtime 
regulations do not have much impact on employees’ hours worked or hourly wages.  
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we test the fixed-job model of Lewis (1969) and Trejo (1991) by examining 
whether overtime regulations have a significant impact on hours worked and hourly wages, 
focusing on so-called “name-only managers,” an employee category recently in the news in 
Japan.   
In Japan, name-only store manager refers to an employee who has essentially the same 
job description as other employees, but who is designated a manager by the company to exempt 
them from overtime regulations and make them ineligible for overtime pay. Japan’s Labor 
Standards Act requires employers to pay employees at least a 25 percent overtime premium for 
hours worked beyond the statutory work hours, but “managers” are exempt from this 
requirement. The legal definition of manager was left vague, however, making it possible for 
companies to simply name an employee a “manager,” irrespective of their actual job, and 
thereby stop paying overtime. It is said that there are many such employees in Japan’s service 
sector, particularly in the wholesale/retail and hospitality sectors. 
As the name implies, name-only managers are managers in name only, but do the same 
work and are given the same authority and discretion as other employees. The only difference is 
in the applicable regulations on hours worked. Because of this, a comparison of name-only 
managers with other employees makes it possible to identify the impact that overtime 
regulations have on actual hours worked and hourly wages. That is, if name-only managers, 
despite not receiving overtime pay, earn the same effective hourly wage (total annual salary 
including overtime pay and bonus divided by total hours worked) as other employees because   20
their base salary is higher, it would mean that the fixed-job model holds. Under the fixed-job 
model, overtime regulations have little impact on the effective hourly wages since employer and 
employee make an implicit contract for a total job package of wages and hours.  
We use longitudinal data on employees in Japan from the Keio Household Panel Survey 
(KHPS) for the years 2004 to 2008 to examine whether the exemption from overtime 
regulations, as is the case for name-only managers, causes any change in hours worked or 
effective hourly wages for employees in the service sector, and specifically in the 
wholesale/retail and hospitality sectors.  
Using the survey as repeated cross-section data, we found that name-only managers 
exempted from overtime regulations worked longer hours than non-exempt employees for non-
university graduates working in the service sector and employees working in the 
wholesale/retail and hospitality sectors. However, we found that the effective hourly wages of 
name-only managers were not any lower than for other employees when controlling for 
employee characteristics. This implies that name-only managers’ base salary was higher to 
make up for their loss of overtime pay, keeping their effective hourly wages as high as those for 
other employees. This result supports the fixed-job model. Using the survey as longitudinal data 
to account for unobserved employee heterogeneity, we found that when an employee was 
promoted to name-only manager and made exempt from overtime regulations, their hours 
worked did not increase and their wages did not decline. This result also validates the fixed-job 
model.    21
Our results suggest that name-only managers, a recent matter of concern and interest in 
Japan’s service sector, on average earn the same effective hourly wage as other employees, 
because their loss of overtime pay as a result of being made exempt has been offset by their 
higher base salary. It is important to note, however, that our analysis only examines the average 
impact (ATE) of overtime regulations, and does not imply that there are not any name-only 
managers who are paid an unfairly low effective hourly wage. In fact, in the lawsuit filed 
against McDonald’s Japan noted in the introduction, the court ruled on the side of the name-
only managers, and ordered the company to pay the unpaid overtime. Another way to interpret 
this ruling is that it is precisely because name-only managers are treated fairly on average that 
treatment unfair enough to trigger a lawsuit would be deemed unjust by the court.  
Another interesting aspect is that this court decision, together with society’s growing 
concern and interest, has led McDonald’s Japan and many other companies to introduce new 
employment rules that do not classify store managers as part of management. Particularly 
interesting is that although name-only managers will be paid overtime under the new rules, their 
base salary (including store manager allowances and other assignment allowances) will be 
reduced such that there is no change in either their annual compensation or effective hourly 
wage. In other words, when name-only managers are returned to non-exempt status, their base 
salaries are normally reduced to ensure no change in their effective hourly wage. This is what 
the fixed-job model predicts. We expect this trend to be further reinforced by a subsequent 
directive from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, which adds “the receipt of an 
appropriate salary” as a requirement for being classified as management.    22
Recently, there has been heated debate in Japan over which regulations are likely to 
produce the most desirable work environment. The government outlined its vision for achieving 
economic growth while striking a balance between work and leisure in two publications: Action 
Principles for Achieving Work-Life Balance (Shigoto to Seikatsu no Chowa Kenshou ), released 
in December 2007, and Guidelines for Reassessing Work Hours (Roudou Jikan tou Minaoshi no 
Gaidorain), released in March 2008.  
One debate over work-life balance revolves around the question of whether regulations 
on hours worked should be relaxed to allow white collar workers who meet certain requirements 
to control their own work hours, i.e., whether there is a need to encourage broader use of a US-
style white collar exemption. Opinion on the effect of such a white collar exemption is divided, 
with some believing it would prevent Japanese from working such long hours, and others 
thinking it would result in even longer working hours. This has been debated repeatedly by 
labor, management, the administration, and the Diet, and no conclusion has been reached on 
whether the exemption should be expanded.  
Because our analysis focuses on the service sector, it is not aimed at predicting the 
impact on hours worked and hourly wages from introducing a US-style white collar exemption 
to a broader range of Japanese workers. Nevertheless, assuming that the characteristics of the 
service sector reflect to some degree those of Japan’s overall labor market, for the fixed-job 
model to hold would probably imply that introducing a US-style white collar exemption would 
be unlikely to have much effect on workers’ behavior.  
   23
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Number of sample 103 263
Treatment group Control group
Service sector
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Eating and
Drinking Places, Lodging
Bad health dummy














Notes:  Numbers are average, and numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.   26
Table 2 Estimation results: cross-section approach 
(1) Weekly hours of work 
52.50 51.85 0.65   0.78   0.89   0.92  
(11.56) (10.64) (0.68) (0.91) (0.83) (0.71)
[339] [1035] <0.34> <0.39> <0.28> <0.20>
50.27 51.72 -1.44   -1.31   -2.23   -1.77 *
University graduates (10.18) (10.07) (1.00) (1.50) (1.37) (1.02)
[139] [379] <0.15> <0.38> <0.10> <0.08>
54.05 51.92 2.12 ** 2.21 * 2.60 ** 2.61 **
Others (12.22) (10.96) (0.91) (1.15) (1.13) (0.95)
[200] [656] <0.02> <0.05> <0.02> <0.01>
56.67 53.22 3.45 ** 3.00 * 2.69   2.66 *
(12.33) (10.59) (1.29) (1.72) (1.70) (1.43)
[103] [263] <0.01> <0.08> <0.12> <0.06>
52.89 52.78 0.10   -2.74   -1.43   -1.28  
University graduates (9.27) (9.35) (1.95) (2.28) (2.47) (1.85)
[35] [65] <0.96> <0.23> <0.56> <0.49>
58.62 53.36 5.25 ** 3.68 * 3.22   3.60 **
Others (13.30) (10.99) (1.63) (2.23) (2.27) (1.81)
[68] [198] <0.00> <0.10> <0.16> <0.05>
ATC (a-b)






Wholesale and Retail Trade,
Eating and Drinking Places,
Lodging
 
(2) Hourly wage 
3.15 2.81 0.34 ** 0.29 ** 0.17   0.15 **
(1.54) (1.16) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07)
[339] [1035] <0.00> <0.00> <0.10> <0.04>
3.72 2.95 0.78 ** 1.04 ** 0.55 ** 0.39 **
University graduates (1.71) (1.20) (0.13) (0.20) (0.22) (0.10)
[139] [379] <0.00> <0.00> <0.01> <0.00>
2.75 2.73 0.02   -0.04   -0.05   -0.08  
Others (1.27) (1.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09)
[200] [656] <0.80> <0.69> <0.68> <0.36>
2.48 2.42 0.05   0.08   0.05   -0.01  
(1.08) (0.85) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.10)
[103] [263] <0.62> <0.54> <0.74> <0.95>
3.11 2.62 0.49 ** 0.85 ** 0.36   0.20  
University graduates (1.36) (0.91) (0.23) (0.25) (0.33) (0.18)
[35] [65] <0.03> <0.00> <0.28> <0.26>
2.16 2.36 -0.21 * -0.18   -0.04   -0.09  
Others (0.74) (0.82) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.09)
[68] [198] <0.07> <0.12> <0.75> <0.35>
Service sector
Wholesale and Retail Trade,







Simple Matching PS-Matching PS-WLS
 
Notes: 1. Numbers in parentheses are t-values. Numbers in brackets are p-values. Numbers in angle 
brackets are the number of samples. 
2. * and ** indicates statistical significance at 5 % and 1 %, respectively.   27
Table 3 Estimation results: panel approach 
(1) Weekly hours of work 
-0.14 -0.17 0.03   0.48  
(7.72) (6.99) (0.70) (1.00)
[115] [865] <0.97> <0.63>
-1.38 0.16 -1.53   -3.77 **
University graduates (7.48) (6.57) (1.04) (1.81)
[48] [307] <0.14> <0.04>
0.75 -0.34 1.09   0.76  
Others (7.83) (7.21) (0.94) (1.20)
[67] [558] <0.25> <0.53>
0.44 -0.50 0.94   0.94  
(7.27) (7.91) (1.35) (1.35)
[39] [236] <0.49> <0.49>
-0.15 -0.13 -0.02   -5.46  
University graduates (5.34) (7.70) (2.25) (3.37)
[13] [62] <0.99> <0.11>
0.73 -0.63 1.36   1.73  
Others (8.15) (7.99) (1.68) (2.10)







Wholesale and Retail Trade,




(2) Hourly wage 
0.08 0.11 -0.02   -0.06  
(0.70) (0.57) (0.06) (0.09)
[115] [865] <0.67> <0.52>
0.02 0.11 -0.09   0.03  
University graduates (0.62) (0.62) (0.10) (0.14)
[48] [307] <0.35> <0.85>
0.13 0.11 0.02   0.11  
Others (0.76) (0.53) (0.07) (0.13)
[67] [558] <0.77> <0.37>
0.04 0.12 -0.09   -0.11  
(0.51) (0.44) (0.08) (0.11)
[39] [236] <0.28> <0.34>
0.00 0.08 -0.08   -0.20  
University graduates (0.48) (0.54) (0.16) (0.26)
[13] [62] <0.62> <0.45>
0.06 0.14 -0.08   -0.02  
Others (0.54) (0.41) (0.09) (0.13)







Wholesale and Retail Trade,




Notes: 1. Numbers in parentheses are t-values. Numbers in brackets are p-values. Numbers in angle 
brackets are the number of samples. 
2. * and ** indicates statistical significance at 5 % and 1 %, respectively. 